Criminal activities have always been a part of human society, and even today, in a world of extremely advanced surveillance and policing capabilities, many different kinds of crimes are still committed in almost every social environment. However, since those who commit crimes are not representative of the majority of their community, members of these communities tend to wish to report crime when they see it; however, they are often reluctant to do so for fear of their own safety should the people they report identify them. Thus, a great deal of crime goes unreported, and investigations fail to gain key evidence from witnesses, which serves only to foster an environment in which criminal activity is more likely to occur. In order to address this problem, this paper proposes an online illegal event reporting scheme based on cloud technology, which combines digital certificates, symmetric keys, asymmetric keys, and digital signatures. The proposed scheme can process illegal activity reports from the reporting event to the issuing of a reward. The scheme not only ensures informers' safety, anonymity and non-repudiation, but also prevents cases and reports being erased, and ensures data integrity. Furthermore, the proposed scheme is designed to be robust against abusive use, and is able to preclude false reports. Therefore, it provides a convenient and secure platform for reporting and fighting crime.
Introduction
In today's technologically advanced society, mechanisms for fighting crime are extremely advanced, from remote, automatic surveillance to sophisticated dedicated laboratories and evidence analysis, yet crime still has a significant presence in our world, both globally and in local communities, including sexual assault, drugs and violent crimes, all of which endanger the public. While some people may be willing to actively report illegal acts, others choose not to do so, as they are worried about the fallibility of the policing, reporting and criminal justice systems, based on previous failings in all three departments [1] [2] [3] . People are afraid for their own safety should those they report identify them, or they are worried that law enforcement officials may simply erase any case they report. Moreover, people afraid of intimidation may choose not to offer information, or stand as a witness to criminal acts, despite a high reward being offered for such information. All of these concerns have, in the past, contributed to an environment in which crime is more difficult to address, and in which crime is more likely to be committed. However, recent years have seen rapid developments in Internet technology, in particular cloud technology, which have made possible an online crime reporting system with identity protection. In fact, the high degree of identity protection offered by these technological advances is a necessity for any such online crime reporting system [4] .
(2) That informers' identities may be disclosed in the reward procedure. The system must protect the privacy of informers in any actions, so the proposed scheme includes a precautionary mechanism to ensure that managers or databases are not leaked, as there is no record to track the identity of a person making a report.
(3) That reported information may be intercepted or leaked, revealing the informer's identity. Therefore, it is essential to ensure complete transmission confidentiality.
To sum up, an online reporting system should meet the following requirements: authentication, anonymity, integrity, and non-repudiation, preventing cases from being erased, avoiding the disclosure of informer identity in the award procedure, protecting the privacy of informers, and preventing the reported information from being intercepted.
Methodology
This section describes how the proposed online crime reporting system with identity protection protects informer identity and privacy during the reporting process, how the proposed system prevents cases being erased, and the automatic reward process.
Notations
U x -user x is categorized as: informer U i , investigator U t , superior U s U i -informer U t -investigator U s -superior Server PLA -reporting server Server CA -certificate authority server TF Gateway -cooperating payment server ID x -the reporting system account of U x PW x -the reporting system password of U x PW HASH -the hash value of a password SN event -the serial number of a case ACC i -the bank account of U i Cash-the reward amount SN-the serial number of an IC (Integrated Circuit) card IDNO-the ID number of an IC card (last four digits) PUK Ux -the public key of U x PRK Ux -the private key of U x Msg event -attached data for reporting (e.g., photos and related documents) Msg suc -success response from reporting server Msg unsuc -unsuccessful response from reporting server Msg CA -the result of verification from the CA (Certificate Authority) server Msg ver -the audit result of reporting case form U t or U s Msg BANKsuc -notification of remit 
System Structure
The system structure and operation processes of the proposed system are shown in Figure 1 . The main interactive roles are informers, investigators and superiors. The servers include the reporting server, the cooperating payment server, and the certificate authority server. The platform uses digital certificates on personal identification IC (Integrated Circuit) cards, which verify the identity of the user, thus preventing reports by impostors. The user (e.g., informer, investigator and superior) must apply for a personal identification IC card in person at the digital certificate management center. In all operations, the verification of a personal IC card is issued by the reporting platform to the digital certificate management center. In the following descriptions, it is assumed that the user has registered successfully and has logged in to the reporting platform. 
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(1) Informer logs in to the system to make a report, or to process other related operations.
164
(2) The reporting server assigns an investigator to conduct an investigation, and the investigator 165 receives the report of a crime, and determines whether the preliminary evidence is sufficient
166
to open a case.
167
(3) The investigator transmits the result of the audited case to the reporting server.
168
(4) The reporting server transmits the reports audited by the investigator to a superior. In addition,
169
if the investigator does not receive or audit reports within a specified period, the system will 170 automatically notify the superior of the reports. If the upward notification confirms the reports
171
are sufficient to open cases, with a reward to be issued, the reports will be sent to the upper 172 superiors for confirmation. When all the superiors confirm that the details of the report are sufficient for the reward, the financial system will automatically remit the reward to the (1) Informer logs in to the system to make a report, or to process other related operations.
(2) The reporting server assigns an investigator to conduct an investigation, and the investigator receives the report of a crime, and determines whether the preliminary evidence is sufficient to open a case. (3) The investigator transmits the result of the audited case to the reporting server. (4) The reporting server transmits the reports audited by the investigator to a superior. In addition, if the investigator does not receive or audit reports within a specified period, the system will automatically notify the superior of the reports. If the upward notification confirms the reports are sufficient to open cases, with a reward to be issued, the reports will be sent to the upper superiors for confirmation. When all the superiors confirm that the details of the report are sufficient for the reward, the financial system will automatically remit the reward to the informer's account. On the other hand, if the investigator determines that a report is abusing the system, then the superior will re-confirm whether the case is rejected or must be re-investigated to avoid a wrong judgment. (5) Each superior sends the results of the case to the reporting server. (6) When the reporting server receives a superior's determination that the case needs re-investigating, the case will be reassigned to a new superior. (7) When the reporting server receives the confirmation and agrees to issue the reward, the server will notify the financial institution. (8) The cooperating payment server of the financial institution will automatically remit the reward to the informer's account. (9) When the cooperating payment server has remitted the reward, it will notify the reporting server. (10) The reporting server notifies the informer that the remittance has been completed.
Registration Phase
Before a user is granted access to the platform for the first time, they must go to the digital certificate management center to get a personal identification IC card, which they will then use to register and access the platform. Figure 2 is the flow chart of the registration verification phase. The steps of the registration phase are as follows:
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Step 1: UxServerPLA
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User Ux must first register and provide basic information, such as account IDx and password
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PWx. The user Ux will transmit IDx and PWx to the reporting server ServerPLA.
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Step 2: ServerPLAUx
196
After receiving the IDx and PWx , the reporting server verifies the account IDx of the user Ux. If
197
the user account IDx is approved by the server, then user Ux will be asked to insert his/her personal
198
identification IC card to determine whether the IC card is valid.
199
Step 3: UxServerPLA
200
User 
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Step 1: ServerPLAServerCA
207
After receiving the the user's IDNO, SN and public key PUKUx, the reporting server will
208
transmit the SN and authentication data to the OCSP (Online Certificate Status Protocol) service of 209 the certificate authority server ServerCA to check the validity of SN.
210
Step 2: ServerCAServerPLA 211 Figure 2 . The flow chart of the registration phase.
Step 1: U x →Server PLA User U x must first register and provide basic information, such as account ID x and password PW x . The user U x will transmit ID x and PW x to the reporting server Server PLA .
Step 2: Server PLA →U x After receiving the ID x and PW x , the reporting server verifies the account ID x of the user U x . If the user account ID x is approved by the server, then user U x will be asked to insert his/her personal identification IC card to determine whether the IC card is valid.
Step 3: U x →Server PLA User U x must insert the personal identification IC card and enter the PIN code. If the PIN code is correct, then user U x will receive the SN number of the IC card, the public key PUK Ux and his/her personal data (for example, the last four digits of the ID card number IDNO) and the system will send IDNO, SN, and PUK Ux to the reporting server.
Step 1: Server PLA →Server CA After receiving the the user's IDNO, SN and public key PUK Ux , the reporting server will transmit the SN and authentication data to the OCSP (Online Certificate Status Protocol) service of the certificate authority server Server CA to check the validity of SN.
Step 2: Server CA →Server PLA The certificate authority server Server CA will verify the SN sent by the reporting server Server PLA , and send the result Msg CA back to the reporting server.
Step 3: Server PLA After receiving the Msg CA that Server CA has already sent back, the Server PLA can determine whether Msg CA is valid. If it is valid, then user U x is a legal user. The reporting server will then convert the user's password PW x into PW HASH with SHA-256:
Finally, the registration information ID x , encrypted PW HASH , IDNO and public key PUK Ux of the user U x are stored in the database, completing the registration process.
Login Verification Phase
Once a user passes the verification phase, s/he will be allowed to log into the system. The following Steps (1) and (2) describe the login processes and verification steps. Figure 3 shows the flow chart of the login verification phase. The certificate authority server ServerCA will verify the SN sent by the reporting server ServerPLA,
212
and send the result MsgCA back to the reporting server.
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Step 3: ServerPLA
214
After receiving the MsgCA that ServerCA has already sent back, the ServerPLA can determine convert the user's password PWx into PWHASH with SHA-256: 
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Once a user passes the verification phase, s/he will be allowed to log into the system. The
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following Steps (1) and (2) describe the login processes and verification steps. 
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226
The user Ux logs into the reporting platform and enters the account IDx and password PWx, and 227 then sends this information. This will convert the password PWx into PWHASH:
Then the ServerPLA uses the public key PUKSERVERPLA to encrypt IDx and PWHASH. After this, the 229 encrypted message C1is transmitted to the reporting server:
Step 2: ServerPLAUx Step 1: U x →Server PLA The user U x logs into the reporting platform and enters the account ID x and password PW x , and then sends this information. This will convert the password PW x into PW HASH :
231
Then the Server PLA uses the public key PUK SERVERPLA to encrypt ID x and PW HASH . After this, the encrypted message C 1 is transmitted to the reporting server:
Step 2: Server PLA →U x When the reporting server receives the encrypted message C 1 , the server Server PLA will use its own private key PRK SERVERPLA to decrypt C 3 :
The user U x , account ID x and password PW HASH will be obtained, and then compared with the data stored in the database. If ID x and PW HASH match the database, Server PLA will respond with a success message Msg suc that the login is successful.
Reporting Phase
In the reporting phase, the informer can log into the system and fill in a crime report by entering the identity of the offender, the related documents and the details of the violation. The informer's identity is not required. The informer simply needs to insert his/her IC card and verify his/her identity. If the informer's identity is correct, the system will allow him/her to submit a report. The flow chart of the reporting phase is shown in Figure 4 .
Step 1: U i →Server PLA The informer U i logs into the reporting platform, enters his/her account ID i and password PW i , and then submits them. This will convert the PW i into PW HASH :
After this, PUK SERVERPLA uses the public key to encrypt ID i and PW HASH and then send the encrypted message C 4 to the reporting server:
Step 2: Server PLA →U i When the reporting server receives the encrypted message C 2 from the informer U i , the server will use the private key PRK SERVERPLA to decrypt message C 2 :
The informer U i account ID i and password PW HASH will be obtained and then compared with the data stored in the database. If ID i and PW HASH match the related data in the database, Server PLA will reply Msg suc to inform U i that they have successfully logged in.
Step 3: U i →Server PLA Then, the informer U i enters the report event Msg event and encrypts ID i and Msg event by public key PUK SERVERPLA . The encrypted message C 3 will be sent to the reporting server:
Step 4: Server PLA →U i The reporting server Server PLA uses its own private key PRK SERVERPLA to decrypt C 3 , and then gets the informer's ID i and report event Msg event :
It then checks that the form is completed. If the information is completed, the Server PLA will request the informer U i to insert his/her IC card.
PWHASH = H(PWi)
(5) (5) After this, PUKSERVERPLA uses the public key to encrypt IDi and PWHASH and then send the 246 encrypted message C4 to the reporting server:
Step 2: ServerPLAUi
248
When the reporting server receives the encrypted message C2 from the informer Ui, the server 249 will use the private key PRKSERVERPLA to decrypt message C2:
251
Check if ID i and PW HASH exists in database
request U i to inserts a IC card Step 5: U i →Server PLA After this, U i inserts his/her IC card and enters his/her PIN code. If the PIN code is correct, it will use the informer's private key PRK Ui to sign the reported event Msg event :
Next, SN and IDNO are obtained from the informer U i 's IC card, and the public key PUK SERVERPLA is used to encrypt the SN and IDNO:
Finally, Server PLA sends the encrypted message C 4 and the informer's signature Sig i to the reporting server.
Step 6: Server PLA →Server CA The reporting server receives C 4 and Sig i of U i , and then uses the server's private key PRK SERVERPLA to decrypt C 4 , and obtains the IDNO and SN of U i. .
The reporting server will transmit the SN to the OCSP service of the certificate authority server through a secure channel to check the validity of SN.
Step 7: Server CA →Server PLA The certificate authority server Server CA will verify the SN from the reporting Server PLA and send the result Msg CA back to Server PLA .
Step 8: Server PLA When the reporting server receives the result of the certificate authority server Server CA and it is effective, it will then compare the information in signature Sig i and messages (ID i , Msg event ):
If the signature is correct, the server will compare the IDNO of the IC card with the IDNO stored in the database. If the comparison is successful, the system will generate an event number SN event . This event number SN event will be associated with the identity of the informer. Therefore, the system will encrypt the ID i of the U i with symmetric key from Server PLA :
Finally, the SN event , Msg event , C 5 and Sig i are saved in the database.
The Superior Verification Phase
Upon logging into the system, the investigator will conduct an investigation of reported crimes randomly assigned by the system. If the reported case is illegal and has a reward, it will be forwarded to the superior to issue the reward. On the other hand, if it is a non-reward case, the investigator will indicate the case processing status as "closed". This phase verifies individual identification of the IC card as in the case reporting phase steps (6)- (7). The case before the superior will only receive and display relevant documents and content, and does not contain the identity of the informer because the identity of the informer was confirmed at the beginning of the reporting phase, which means the informer is a legal user, and the whole process of the report is guaranteed to be anonymous. The following steps (1)-(4) describe the auditing process and give an overview of verification, as shown in Figure 5 .
Step 1: U t →Server PLA ;U t →U s When the investigator U t receives the report event Msg event assigned by the system, the investigator investigates that event. If the investigation shows that it is an illegal event with reward, the investigator U t will be requested to insert his/her IC card and enter his/her PIN code. If the PIN code is correct, the server will use the investigator U t 's private key PRK Ut to sign the case. The signature of the investigator Sig t includes the identity of the investigator ID t , event number SN event , reporting event Msg event , event verification result Msg ver and the reward amount Cash:
The investigator will close it, and the ID t , SN event , Msg event , Msg ver , Cash and Sig t are stored directly in the database. Step 2: Server PLA When the reporting server receives the signature of the undertaker, the ID t , SN event , Msg event , Msg ver , Cash and Sig t will be stored in the database.
Step 3: U s →Server PLA ;U s →U t When the superior receives the signature of the investigator, the superior U s will use the public key PUK Ut of the undertaker U t to check whether the signature is correct. If it is correct, then the illegal event has passed the undertaker's audit:
At this point, the superior U s audits the case checked by the investigator U t again. If the superior agrees to issue the reward, then the case will be decided by signature. The reporting server will then request that the superior U s insert the IC card and enter the PIN code. If the PIN code is correct, the superior will use the IC card private key PRK Us to sign the case:
The superior then sends ID s , ID t , SN event , Msg event , Msg ver , Cash and Sig s to the reporting server and the investigator.
However, reward amounts differ from case to case. When the superior thinks the case requires further evaluation, this means the reward amount is higher than the superior thought. The superior thus sends ID s , ID t , SN event , Msg event , Msg ver , Cash and Sig s to the upper superior to audit. The upper superior will follow the above steps to audit the case.
Step 4: Server PLA →U i When the reporting server receives the signature of the superior, it will store ID s , ID t , SN event , Msg event , Msg ver , Cash and Sig s in the database, and then check whether the audited case has been signed one by one. The reporting server uses the investigator's public key PUK Ut to verify the signature Sig t . If it is correct, then the investigator has already audited the case:
The reporting server then verifies the signature of the superior U s using the superior's public key PUK Us to verify signature Sig s . If it is correct, then the reward has already been issued by the superior. In addition, if the reporting server receives all superiors' signatures Sig s , it will verify all signatures Sig s by the following equation:
When the reporting server verifies the signature of the superior, it will automatically transmit a notification to the informer. Therefore, when the informer U i logs into the platform, s/he will receive a notification to enter his/her the banking details ACC i .
Reward Issuing Phase
When the informer logs into the system and receives a remittance notification from the reporting server, the informer must fill in the remittance account within the effective period, beyond which the reward will not be issued. The reporting server will remit the reward through the designated payment server according to the existing remittance mechanism of the cooperating financial institution. Steps (1)-(4) describe the reward issuing process. The flow chart of reward issuing is shown in Figure 6 . Step 1: U i →Server PLA The informer U i logs into the system and receives a remittance notification, and then enters the bank account ACC i . Server PLA uses the public key PUK SERVERPLA to encrypt the bank account ACC i and sends the encrypted message C 8 to the reporting server:
Step 2: Server PLA →TF Gateway The reporting server receives C 8 from the informer U i , then Server PLA uses the private key PRK SERVERPLA to decrypt C 8 , and obtain the bank account ACC i of U i :
The Server PLA then uses its private key PRK SERVERPLA to sign the remittance information:
and sends the remittance information and signature to the designated cooperating payment server TF Gateway , and starts the payment.
Step 3: TF Gateway →Server PLA When the payment server TF Gateway receives the remittance information and signature Sig SERVERPLA , it uses the server's public key PUK SERVERPLA to verify the signature:
If the verification is successful, the server will issue the reward to the informer U i , and send a message Msg BANKsuc to the reporting server.
Step 4: Server PLA →U i When the reporting server receives the reply message Msg BANKsuc of remittance from the cooperating payment server TF Gateway , the server will verify the remittance information. If it is correct, then the remittance has been successful. After this, the server will send a message to inform the informer U i that the reward has been remitted to the designated account. Finally, the reporting server uses the symmetric key KEY of Server PLA to encrypt ACC i and Msg BANKsuc , and then stores the encrypted message C 9 in the database:
2.2.6. The Judgment of and Punishment for Abusing the System If a report is judged by the investigator U t to be abuse of the system, the report will be sent upward to the superior U s for further evaluation. When the reporting server receives confirmation from all the superiors that the report is abuse, it will suspend the informer, denying them access to the system for a period of time. If the user repeatedly abuses the system, and reaches the maximum threshold of abuse instances, the informer will be permanently banned from the system. On the other hand, as long as one superior U s confirms that the requires further evaluation, the reporting server will assign it to another investigator to re-check. This not only prevents bad judgments, but also prevents cases being erased. In the registration phase, the user can click the register button and enter the registration page, as shown in Figure 7 . On this page the user must enter his/her account and password for registration. The system will then ask the user to insert his/her personal identity IC card and enter his/her PIN code, as shown in Figure 8 . If the PIN code is correct, the system will send the SN to the certificate authority center via SSL (Secure Socket Layer) secure channel, and verify the user's identity. If the verification result is correct, then the registration is complete. 
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398 399 Figure 9 . Login page.
Reporting Phase
The informer can fill in the crime report form, inquire about the progress of cases, or modify personal data when logged into in the system. Figure 10 shows the flowchart of the reporting process. To report a crime, the informer selects the "Report" option, as shown in Figure 11 and fills out the form, as shown in Figure 12 . When the informer submits the report form, the system asks the informer to insert his/her identity IC card (as shown in Figure 13 ) to verify his/her identity. If his/her identity is verified, the reporting procedure is completed. 
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Contracting the Events
416
The flowchart of the investigator's auditing process is shown in figure. 14. Figure 15 shows the 417 main investigator page. The investigator can click the "pending" button in the menu of Figure 16 to 418 check all cases pending investigation. All the pending cases are randomly assigned by the system to 419 investigators. Figure 17 shows the list of pending cases. Clicking the last column of each case will 420 open the auditing page, which shows the details for each case (see Figure 18 ). There are three 421 Figure 11 . Informer menu page. 
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The flowchart of the investigator's auditing process is shown in figure. 14. Figure 15 shows the 417 main investigator page. The investigator can click the "pending" button in the menu of Figure 16 to 418 check all cases pending investigation. All the pending cases are randomly assigned by the system to 419 investigators. Figure 17 shows the list of pending cases. Clicking the last column of each case will 420 open the auditing page, which shows the details for each case (see Figure 18 ). There are three 421 Figure 13 . Informer IC card verification page.
Contracting the Events
The flowchart of the investigator's auditing process is shown in Figure 14 . Figure 15 shows the main investigator page. The investigator can click the "pending" button in the menu of Figure 16 to check all cases pending investigation. All the pending cases are randomly assigned by the system to investigators. Figure 17 shows the list of pending cases. Clicking the last column of each case will open the auditing page, which shows the details for each case (see Figure 18 ). There are three notification choices in Figure 18 to indicate the auditing result. The meanings of these three choices are detailed as follows:
(1) 【Abuse】button: If the reported case is not within the scope of contracting, or the reported content is not real, this choice will be used to report it to the system. (2) 【Reward】button: If the reported case is verified as real and must be rewarded, clicking the button will authorize the reward being issued. (3) 【Closed】button: If the reported case is verified as real and without reward, then clicking this button closes the case.
When the auditing result is submitted, the system will verify the IC card of the investigator, as shown in Figure 19 .
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Upper Superior
1.
【Reward】: When the reward has been confirmed for issue, the superior clicks the 【Reward】button, as shown in Figure 25 .
2.
【Abuse】: When the superior clicks the 【Abuse】 button in Figure 26 , this means the case is an abusive reporting case.
3.
【Retrial】: When a case is in doubt, it must be re-investigated. Such cases are called "retrial cases" and will be randomly assigned to a new investigator. The upper superior can designate a case in which there is cause for doubt as a retrial case by pressing the 【Retrial】 button, shown in Figure 26 . The system will automatically reassign the retrial case to another investigator. 
Discussion
The Identity of the Informer
To ensure the legality of the user' identity, the system will verify the informer's account ID i and password PW HASH when the informer logs into the system:
Moreover, when the informer reports a crime, the informer must have an IC card. The system will obtain the SN and the last four digits of IDNO from the informer's IC card. The SN will then be sent to Server CA via SSL secure channel for verification:
Scenario: Malicious users may continue to make false reports in an attempt to crash the reporting system's server.
Analysis: The attack will fail because when an informer reports a crime; s/he must use their physical ID card, which includes the serial number SN and the ID number IDNO of the IC card. When the number of malicious reports exceeds the system threshold, the user's reporting permission will be suspended. The proposed scheme can thus protect legal users' identities from being abused, and can also prevent malicious reporting behavior.
Anonymous Reporting
In the reporting procedure, the system verifies the informer's identity by certificate authority center so that the informer does not have to fill in personal information. When the center has checked the identity, it generates a case number. The content and ID i will be encrypted and stored in the database:
Therefore, the crime reports are stored in the database in such a way that the identity of informers is protected.
Scenario: If an informer's true identity is leaked during the reporting process, his/her safety may be at risk as a result.
Analysis: Any attempt to obtain an informer's the true identity will fail, as in the proposed scheme, the key message is encrypted with the asymmetric key of the reporting server. Only the legal reporting server can know the true identity of the informer. Therefore, malicious users will not be able to obtain the true identity of the informer and threaten their safety.
The Integrity of the Data
1. The reporting server uses the following formula to confirm whether the case has been reported by the informer him/herself:
Scenario: Malicious users may try to intercept the report in order to modify its content. Analysis: The attack will fail because the message is encrypted with the public key of the reporting server C 3 = E PUKSERVERPLA (ID i , Msg event ), and signed with the private key of the informer Sig i = S PRKUi (ID i , Msg event ). Thus, malicious users cannot modify report content.
2. An investigator attaches their signature when a case has been audited. The following formula can then be used to verify the signature to ensure the case is signed by the investigator correctly:
Scenario: Malicious users may try to intercept the investigator's audit results in order to modify them.
Analysis: The attack will fail because the message is signed with the private key of the investigator Sig t = S PRKUt (ID t , SN event , Msg event , Msg ver , Cash). Thus, malicious users cannot modify audit results.
3. The reporting server can ensure that the reward is issued by the superior using the following equation:
Scenario: Malicious users may try to intercept the reward information from the superior in order to modify it.
Analysis: The attack will fail because the message is signed with the private key of the superior Sig s = S PRKUs (ID s , ID t , SN event , Msg event , Msg ver , Cash). Thus, malicious users cannot modify the reward information.
Non-Repudiation
In order to ensure non-repudiation, the proposed system has a completion verification mechanism, as shown in Table 1 , which achieves non-repudiation as follows:
•
The reporting server will verify the informer's signature Sig i ; therefore, the informer cannot deny the signature.
The reporting server will verify the investigator's signature Sig t ; therefore, the investigator cannot deny the signature.
The superior receives the Sig t of a reward case form an investigator, and the superior will verify the Sig t ; therefore, the investigator cannot deny the signature.
The reporting server receives the Sig s , which means the superior agrees to issue the reward; therefore, the superior cannot deny that they confirmed the reward.
The cooperating payment server will receive the Sig SERVERPLA issued by the reporting server; therefore, the reporting server cannot deny that it confirmed the reward. 
Preventing the Case Being Erased
The proposed system is equipped with an automatic notification mechanism to prevent investigators ignoring cases. If an investigator does not audit a case within a default period of time, the reporting server will automatically send the case to an upper superior.
Secure Reward Issuing
The secure issuing of the reward is shown in Figure 27 , and the processes are as follows:
(1) Auditing phase:
The U t and U S send Sig t and Sig s to Server PLA , respectively: 
According to Formulae (39) and (40), only if the signature verification is successful will the Server PLA instruct the U i to enter the remittance account.
Scenario: The informer attempts to modify the survey results, change the survey failure to success, or change the reward amount.
Analysis: The attack will fail to modify the survey results or reward information because the message is signed with the private key of the investigator Sig t = S PRKUt (ID t , SN When U i receives the notice from Server PLA , U i provides the remittance account ACC i . Then, the account ACC i is encrypted by Formula (41) and the encryption C 8 is sent to Server PLA . When the reporting server Server PLA receives C 8 , it decrypts C 8 by Formula (42) to obtain the ACC i of the U i :
Then, Server PLA signs the remittance information by Formula (43) and sends it to the TF Gateway via SSL, and begins the payment:
The server uses Formula (44) to verify the signature. If the signature is correct, the cooperating payment server will remit to the U i , and then send the completed message to the Server PLA , thus preventing an incorrect amount being paid, or payment being made to the wrong person.
From the above analysis, the reward mechanism cannot be corrupted or altered. Therefore, it ensures the security of the identity of the informer. In addition, the system uses an automatic remittance mechanism. The signature mechanism ensures the identity of the superior, and this mechanism therefore not only ensures the identity, but also the confirmation of the reward. This shows that the system uses digital signatures, asymmetric key, and SSL to achieve the remittance operations.
Scenario: Malicious users attempt to modify the bank account information, and try to get the rewards of the informer.
Analysis: The attack will fail because the message is signed with the private key of the reporting server Sig SERVERPLA = S PRKSERVERPLA (ID SERVERPLA , ID i , ACC i , Cash). After the designated cooperating payment server TF Gateway receives the message via secure channel, it will verify (ID SERVERPLA , ID i , ACC i , Cash) ≟ V PUKSERVERPLA (Sig SERVERPLA ). Thus, the attacker cannot modify the bank account information to get the rewards. 
Untraceability
In order to protect the privacy of informers in any actions, the proposed system uses a symmetric key algorithm to encrypt its database, further protecting the identity of the informer:
4.8. Confidentiality
(1) The reporting server uses the SSL security protocol to ensure secure data transmission. In the registration phase, a one-way hash function is used to convert PW x into PW HASH , which prevent user passwords being leaked:
(2) The system encrypts the ID i of the U i with the symmetric key of Server PLA to protect the identity of the informer in the event of a database security breach:
(3) In the auditing and reward phases, the server uses the asymmetric key of Server PLA to encrypt ACC i , and Msg BANKsuc to protect sensitive informer information:
Comparison
The following compares the work in this study with the literature relating to online crime reporting systems with identity protection, as shown in Table 2 . Table 2 shows that [1, 2, 6, 7] respectively proposed an anonymous on-line crime reporting system. However, these systems mostly do not support authentication, data integrity, non-repudiation, prevention of case deletion, untraceability, the reward mechanism, confidentiality, preclusion of false reports and theoretical analysis etc. Thus, the proposed scheme is a more secure and practical reporting system based on cryptography.
Conclusions
Despite its continued presence in many (if not all) communities, some people are still afraid to report crimes, as they fear for their own safety should their identities become known to those they report. This results in an environment in which it is difficult to combat crime, and in which crime is even more likely to occur. In order to address this problem, this study proposes a cloud-based online crime reporting system with identity protection. The system not only addresses the concern that an informer's identity may be revealed, but in doing so unites communities in combating crime. The proposed system combines digital certificates, encryption and decryption technology, and the credibility of a third party with the necessary certification. Thus it is able to verify informer identities, prevent the exposure of those identities, as well as preventing reports being erased. Using this simple and safe online reporting system, people can safely report criminal activity, thus improving and protecting the quality of life in their communities. The proposed scheme addresses all the security requirements to allow the reporting of crimes, while ensuring informers' safety, security, anonymity and convenience. Furthermore, the proposed scheme is designed to be robust against abusive use, and is able to preclude false reports. Table 2 shows that the proposed method outperforms other related schemes. This study developed the reporting system for testing, and future work will collect data and evaluate its performance for system improvement. Finally, the authors hope that the proposed reporting system will be an effective and widely used tool in the ongoing fight against crime. 
